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11 Introduction
At its peak in 2000, corporate venturing (CV) represented $16.2 billion of investments in the U.S.1 At
the time, 16 cents out of every dollar invested in new ventures came from corporate venturing ￿rms,
who participated in about 25% of all deals. Corporate venturing investments had risen dramatically
with entrepreneurial activity during the internet boom, up from $1 billion in 1997, and evaporated just
as quickly afterwards, down to $1.2 billion in the ￿rst 9 months of 2002 (Taylor, 2003). Despite their
importance, the nature of corporate venturing and its pro-cyclical ￿ uctuations with entrepreneurial
activity are still largely unexplained.2 Is corporate venturing simply a way for ￿rms to capture some of
the high returns that they observe in entrepreneurial ventures - a ￿gravy train￿rationale - or is it part
of a broader corporate strategy? In this paper we propose two novel and complementary explanations
for corporate venturing that are based on competition for talent.
We present a model where a ￿rm and a venture capitalist (VC) compete for the recruitment of a
star manager who has an idea and a unique skill to run a new venture. The star may choose the VC￿ s
o⁄er, in which case the VC ￿nances her project, and she manages the new venture.3 Alternatively, she
may choose the ￿rm￿ s o⁄er, in which case her task depends on the ￿rm￿ s organizational structure: if
organized as a corporation, the ￿rm will assign the star the task of managing its main line of business;
while if organized for corporate venturing it can ￿nance the star￿ s project and let her manage the new
venture. The main di⁄erence between the new venture and the ￿rm￿ s main business is that the star￿ s
marginal product of e⁄ort is higher in the new project than in the more routine main business.
When returns to venturing are low, ￿nancing the star￿ s project is not lucrative for the ￿rm, and
competition from the VC is low for the same reason. The ￿rm prefers to organize as a corporation,
recruiting the star to manage its main business. As returns to venturing increase, the relative attrac-
1We de￿ne corporate venturing as the ￿nancing and development of new business ventures by large established compa-
nies, either inside (intrapreneurship) or outside (corporate venture capital) the corporate structure. In the United States,
over 200 corporations were listed in the 2002 Directory of Corporate Venturing as investing as active corporate venture
capitalists. Corporations also invest in venture capital through specialized institutions such as venture capital funds.
At the end of 2001, corporations were the second largest source of capital to venture capital funds, after endowments
and foundations, with total commitments of about $35 billion (Goldman and Russell, 2002). Although some of these
investments, often organized through partnerships, are sometimes included in the de￿nition of corporate venturing, they
are not part of our de￿nition here.
2As is well known, entrepreneurial activity went through a similar boom-and-bust cycles over the same time period:
venture capital investment went from $14.6 billion in 1997 to $105 billion in 2000, down to $17.3 billion in the ￿rst 9
months of 2002 (Brander and Bettignies, 2006). This pro-cyclicality is not new. In the previous two venture capital
￿waves,￿in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and then again in the late 1970s and early 1980s, success in venture capital
spurred corporate venturing investments which quickly shrank at the end of the booms, in 1973 and 1987 respectively
(Gompers and Lerner, 1998, Gompers, 2002).
3For expositional reasons, throughout the paper we refer to the star manager as female, the VC as male, and the ￿rm
as neutral.
2tiveness of corporate venturing increases as well for two reasons. First, investing in a new venture
enables the ￿rm to capture some of the higher returns associated with venturing. This is the ￿gravy
train￿e⁄ect mentioned above. Second, the VC￿ s willingness to bid for the star also increases with
returns to venturing, and the star￿ s equilibrium compensation goes up. The ￿rm responds to higher
compensation costs by o⁄ering higher-powered incentives, which in turn elicit higher managerial e⁄ort.
Foresighted ￿rms may thus choose corporate venturing as a way of allocating stars where the marginal
product of their e⁄ort is highest, i.e. in new ventures. We call this the ￿incentives￿ rationale for
corporate venturing.
Beyond a certain threshold level of returns to venturing, recruiting the star would become too
expensive for the ￿rm, if it were organized as a corporation. Faced with constant bene￿ts but rising
compensation costs, it could no longer match o⁄ers made by the VC, who would ￿steal￿away the
star manager. We show that when returns to venturing are high enough for this problem to arise,
corporate venturing emerges as a solution, enabling the ￿rm to hire/retain talented managers who
would otherwise take another job. We call this the ￿recruitment/retention￿rationale for corporate
venturing.
The key di⁄erence between the gravy train and incentives rationales on the one hand, and the
recruitment explanation on the other, is that they take place at di⁄erent levels of returns to venturing.
Indeed, at low and moderate levels, the ￿rm anticipates that it can successfully recruit the star
regardless of its organizational form, and therefore its organizational choice is more about how to best
allocate the star across its activities. When the gravy train and incentives e⁄ects become su¢ ciently
large, the optimal allocation of talent switches from the main business (corporation) to a new venture
(corporate venturing).
In contrast, at high levels of returns to venturing, the ￿rm anticipates that if it organizes as a cor-
poration, it will not recruit the star. This adds both a cost and a bene￿t to the relative attractiveness
of corporate venturing. On the one hand, by organizing for corporate venturing, the ￿rm has to pay a
large compensation cost in order to recruit the star, a cost which would be avoided if it organized as
a corporation and did not recruit. In our stylized model this cost exactly o⁄sets the gravy train and
incentives e⁄ects mentioned above, as competition for talent ensures that the star extracts all expected
rents from the new venture. On the other hand, organizing for corporate venturing and allowing the
star to develop her idea inside the ￿rm may be a way to prevent her from developing it somewhere
else, e.g. with a VC.
3Suppose that the new venture is correlated to the ￿rm￿ s main business, e.g. through spillovers,
which could be positive or negative. These spillovers will likely bene￿t the main line of business less,
or hurt it more, if the venture is developed by the VC than if it is developed under the umbrella
of corporate venturing, because unlike the ￿rm, the VC will not internalize the impact of the new
venture on the ￿rm￿ s main line of business. Hence, at high levels of returns to venturing, although the
gravy train and incentives e⁄ects disappear, a bene￿t from recruitment and retention of star employees
emerges as the ￿rm attempts to internalize new venture spillovers on its main business.
Despite growing interest, only a few papers have explicitly addressed the question of corporate
venturing theoretically.4 Anton and Yao (1994, 1995), as well as Anand, Galetovic and Stein (2004),
examine this theme in the context of weak property rights. Hellmann (2002) argues that an entrepre-
neur should seek corporate venturing funding when the venture project is complementary to the parent
corporation￿ s main line of business. Amador and Landier (2003) investigate whether innovation is to
be implemented inside incumbent ￿rms or outside by venture capitalists, in a model of entrepreneurial
optimism. Gromb and Scharfstein (2003) analyze how the tradeo⁄ between information and incen-
tives a⁄ects ￿rms￿choice between intrapreneurship and direct venture capital ￿nancing.5 Hellmann
(2006) explores a ￿rm￿ s decision to encourage or discourage exploration of new ideas by employees,
and shows that it depends chie￿ y on the allocation of intellectual property rights and the relative value
of innovation inside and outside the ￿rm.
The thrust of our contribution to this literature is to place competition for talent at the forefront
of the analysis.6 This enables us to highlight several new insights and empirical implications. First,
we provide the two new explanations for corporate venturing and its pro-cyclical ￿ uctuations that we
mentioned: one based on managerial incentives and the optimal allocation of talent; the other based
4For an excellent review of this literature, and of employee innovation in general, see Hellmann (2006).
5Gromb and Scharfstein (2003) consider the ￿safety net￿that intrapreneurship provides to entrepreneurs, who can
get their corporate job back in case of failure. Intrapreneurship provides lower incentives than VC ￿nancing because
of the safety net, but it comes with an informational advantage about the quality of the failed intrapreneur. In their
paper, as well as in Landier￿ s (2006), the market perception of the reasons for failure plays a central role in reaching the
equilibrium level of entrepreneurship. Dix and Gandelman (2003) also look at a similar choice between intrapreneurship
and corporate venture capital, but the tradeo⁄ is based on somewhat di⁄erent informational asymmetries.
6Amador and Landier (2003) and Anand et al. (2004) also developed models in which a manager/entrepreneur with
an innovative idea chooses between contracts o⁄ered by an incumbent ￿rm and a VC. A key feature of Amador and
Landier￿ s model is that the entrepreneur is subject to an optimism bias about her idea. The VC￿ s advantage in recruiting
her lies in its superior ability to exploit her bias through contracts, while the incumbent ￿rm has a cost advantage due to
potential synergies with existing assets. Interestingly, the authors ￿nd that the relative recruiting advantage of the VC
increases with project value - a variable similar to the ￿returns to venturing￿measure used in our model - and predict
that high value projects will be ￿nanced outside the ￿rm. In contrast our model suggests that high value projects may
still be developed inside the ￿rm, as it attempts to internalize the spillovers on its main line of business. In Anand et al.,
the focus is on studying how the strengths of property rights, and the centralization of operations, a⁄ect a ￿rm￿ s ability
to recruit a talented manager. They do not analyze the e⁄ects of changes in returns to venturing and competition for
talent.
4on recruiting and retaining star managers as a spillover internalization strategy. Second, we highlight
the importance of competition for talent as a determinant of ￿rms￿organizational strategy. We show
that - by generating the incentives and recruiting e⁄ects - competition has an unambiguously positive
impact on corporate venturing, inducing ￿rms to switch to corporate venturing ￿sooner￿as returns
to venturing increase. Third, we suggest that spillovers from the new venture to the ￿rm￿ s main
business may have a positive impact on corporate venturing. Interestingly, in contrast with Helmann
(2002), corporate venturing may still be optimal even when spillovers are large and negative, as the
￿rm attempts to preempt the VC￿ s development of the new venture, which would lead to a negative
spillover e⁄ect of an even greater magnitude. Fourth, we extend the model to adress issues related to
￿contractual incompleteness.￿This enables us to examine the impact of intellectual property (IP) rights
on the prevalence of corporate venturing, as well as the e⁄ects of returns to venturing on the optimal
allocation of control rights between the star and the corporate parent. We suggest that weaker IP
protection may be favorable to corporate venturing, and that increased venturing returns may induce
corporate venturing ￿rms to allocate more control rights to the star, thereby switching from tighter
controlled structures, such as internal ventures, to more autonomous structures, such as corporate
venture capital. Finally, we underline the link between competition for talent, economic e¢ ciency,
and corporate venturing: we point out that there may be less corporate venturing in equilibrium than
is socially desirable, but that competition - by increasing the prevalence of corporate venturing - may
improve economic e¢ ciency.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes competition for
star managers when the ￿rm is organized as a corporation, while section 4 looks at these issues in the
context of corporate venturing. In section 5, we characterize the optimal organizational choice and how
it is a⁄ected by returns to venturing, competition for talent, and spillover e⁄ects. Section 6 extends the
model to contractual incompleteness and examines the optimal structure of corporate venturing; while
section 7 discusses other extensions to the model. Section 8 presents the key empirical implications of
the model, and relates them to the empirical literature. Section 9 concludes. The characterization of




A ￿rm intends to recruit a star manager/entrepreneur, and anticipates competition from other insti-
tutions in the ￿market for talent.￿ 7 This star manager has an idea for a new venture that requires
￿nancing. The ￿rm must choose between two organizational structures F 2 fC;CV g, which di⁄er
primarily in the way they allocate talent.
If organized as a corporation (C), the ￿rm focuses on its core competency, and devotes all its
attention and resources to its existing line of business. If recruited, the star would manage the main
business, and her idea for a new venture is not pursued.
If involved in corporate venturing (CV ), the ￿rm does not focus exclusively on its main business,
and is organized so as to be able to pursue new opportunities. This organizational change could take
various forms, from setting up a committee in charge of evaluating employees￿new venture ideas,
to the funding of a full-￿ edged fund devoted to new venture investments, similar to standard venture
capital funds. Under this organizational form, conditional on recruiting the manager, the ￿rm ￿nances
her idea, and the star manages the new venture.
For simplicity, we assume that the main business yields a (dollar) return M with certainty if
managed by the star, and M￿ < M, otherwise. The new venture can only be valuable if it is run by
the star manager, and it can turn out to be of two types. It may be a ￿base hit,￿in which case it
yields a base dollar return ￿ ￿ ￿min (net of initial capital outlay), or a ￿home run,￿in which case
the return is ￿ + ￿, with ￿ > 0. The star exerts a non-veri￿able e⁄ort e which strictly increases the
probability of a home run. For simplicity we assume this probability to be e. Hence, the new venture
yields an expected return ￿+e￿ (gross of e⁄ort cost) when managed by the star, and zero otherwise.
The star is assumed to be risk-neutral and wealth-constrained; and her cost of e⁄ort is c(e) = k
2e2.
A key di⁄erence between the main line of business and the new venture is that the star￿ s marginal
product of e⁄ort is larger in the latter than in the former. The basic idea is that while new ventures
are highly risky and the star can have a large impact on the probability of success, the main line of
business may include (relatively) more of a routine job where the star￿ s e⁄ort has a lower impact. One
could also argue that the management of the new venture likely involves a product that is closer to
7In this paper, we view managerial talent and entrepreneurial talent as requiring similar skills, which appears to be
consistent with the fact that ￿rms lose a large number of successful managers during times of high entrepreneurship (see
footnote 25 in section 8. This contrasts with, for instance, Lazear (2003), who argues that entrepreneurial talent requires
a broad of skills while managerial talent requires perhaps more outstanding, but also more specialized skills.
6the beginning of the life-cycle than its main business counterpart, and that managerial e⁄ort has a
larger impact at the beginning of a product￿ s life-cycle than at its end.
The main business and the new venture are linked in that the new venture yields a spillover, S 2 R,
on the main business. The spillover could be positive and represent superior access to a new technology
for the main line of business, for example, or may capture a reduced-form complementarity between
the products developed in the new venture and those developed in the main business. Alternatively,
S may be negative and capture some form of cannibalization of the main venture products by the new
venture products. The spillovers enable us to take into account the idea, highlighted by Hellmann
(2002), that the venturing ￿rms￿objective is not restricted to maximizing the value of the stand-alone
ventures. Here, the broader objective is the value created by the project as a stand-alone project plus
the spillovers to the main line of business. In our setting, conditional on hiring the star, the ￿rm￿ s
gross (i.e. excluding the compensation cost) expected return is M when organized as a corporation,
and ￿ + e￿ + M￿ + S when organized for corporate venturing.
The ￿rm may fail to recruit the star, who may turn to another institution, say a venture capitalist
(VC), to ￿nance her new venture idea.8 If the star chooses to develop the new venture with the VC,
the ￿rm, regardless of its organizational form (C or CV ), has no access to the star￿ s talent, but may
still receive a spillover (S ￿ ￿) from the new venture to its main business. In other words, the spillover
from the new venture to the ￿rm￿ s main business is lower, be it positive or negative, if the new venture
is developed by the venture capitalist than if it is developed under corporate venturing, and ￿ ￿ 0
represents this spillover di⁄erential. This is simply a reduced-form way of capturing the idea that,
unlike the ￿rm, the VC does not internalize the impact of spillovers on the ￿rm￿ s main line of business.
Thus, if the star chooses to go with the VC, the ￿rm￿ s expected payo⁄ is M￿ +S ￿￿ regardless of
its organizational form. The VC expects a gross payo⁄ ￿ + e￿ from the project if he can recruit the
star and ￿nance the venture; and zero otherwise.
Finally, the following two regularity conditions on the parameters will simplify our analysis (our












+ ", with " ! 0: (2)
8There may be more than one competitor (VC), but there is no loss of generality in focusing on the most productive
one (in the use of the star￿ s talent/idea).
72.2 Competition for Talent and Incentive Contracts
Competition a⁄ects the o⁄ers made by the ￿rm and the VC to the star manager. If the ￿rm is
organized as a corporation and focuses on its main business, the value of recruiting the star does not
depend on her non-contractible e⁄ort. Hence, the corporation￿ s contractual o⁄er is a constant wage
WC, and the star receives a net payo⁄ UC = WC.
In contrast, if the ￿rm engages in corporate venturing, its expected payo⁄depends on the e⁄ort level
e exerted by the star manager, who must thus be incentivized. Since e⁄ort cannot be contracted upon,
the star￿ s compensation package is made contingent on the new venture￿ s realized payo⁄. Speci￿cally,
the star manager receives a ￿xed wage ￿CV with certainty and a fraction ￿CV of incremental payo⁄ ￿
in case of a home run. The fraction ￿CV can be interpreted as a fraction of call options allocated to the
star manager, and will a⁄ect her e⁄ort choice, eCV = e(￿CV ).9 The star￿ s expected compensation can
thus be expressed as WCV = ￿CV +eCV ￿CV ￿, and her net expected payo⁄ is UCV = WCV ￿c(eCV ).
Similarly, the competing VC also o⁄ers a ￿xed wage, ￿V C, and a fraction of call options, ￿V C,
to the star, which imply an expected compensation WV C = ￿V C + eV C￿V C￿, and a net payo⁄
UV C = WV C ￿ c(eV C).
2.3 Timing of the Game
The timing is as follows.
￿ At date 0, Nature reveals parameters ￿, ￿, M, M￿, S, k and ￿, and the ￿rm chooses its
organizational form F 2 fC;CV g.
￿ At date 1, the ￿rm and the VC both make a contractual o⁄er to the star manager. Speci￿cally,
if F = C, the ￿rm o⁄ers WC to the star. If F = CV , the ￿rm o⁄ers f￿CV ;￿CV g, which implies
a net expected payo⁄ UCV to the star. The competitor o⁄ers f￿V C;￿V Cg, which yields UV C to
the star.
￿ At date 2, the star chooses one of the two o⁄ers.
￿ At date 3, the star exerts e⁄ort.
￿ At date 4, the returns are generated and the payo⁄s are distributed.
9As documented in Chemla, Habib, and Ljungqvist (2005) and Schmidt (2003), such clauses appear to be frequently
used in venture capital (and in particular corporate venture capital) contracts. Our results hold if the compensation
package can also be made contingent on the spillover or on the payo⁄ to the main line of business. Such contracts are
not common practice.
83 The Corporation
In this section and the next, we analyze competition for the star manager at date 1, taking the ￿rm￿ s
organizational choice as given. We start by analyzing the case of the corporation, and then move on
to corporate venturing in section 4.
3.1 Contract O⁄ered by the Corporation, Taking UV C as Given
The ￿rm determines the optimal contract and its resulting expected payo⁄ if it recruits the star, and
if it does not, and then chooses among these two strategies the one that maximizes its payo⁄.
If it intends to recruit the star manager, the ￿rm maximizes the following program:
max
W
M ￿ W; (3)
subject to the star￿ s individual rationality (IR) constraint:
W ￿ UV C; (4)
where UV C represents the star manager￿ s (net) reservation payo⁄ (henceforth RP), i.e. her net
expected payo⁄if she chooses the VC￿ s o⁄er to ￿nance the new venture. We assume that if indi⁄erent,
the star will choose the ￿rm￿ s o⁄er, hence the weak inequality in (4). The solution is simple: The
corporation o⁄ers Wr
C (UV C) = UV C to the star, recruiting her at minimum cost, and generating a net
payo⁄ Pr
C (UV C) = M ￿Wr
C (UV C) = M ￿UV C.10 In contrast, if it does not intend to recruit the star,
the ￿rm o⁄ers any Wnr
C (UV C) < UV C, and obtains total expected payo⁄ Pnr
C = M￿ + S ￿ ￿.
We de￿ne UV C as the threshold RP to the star (from the VC) such that the corporation is
indi⁄erent between recruiting her or not: UV C = M ￿M￿ ￿(S ￿￿). Regularity condition (1) implies
UV C > ￿2
8k.
Since Pr
C (UV C) is strictly decreasing in UV C the corporation￿ s best response is to recruit the star
with an o⁄er Wr
C (UV C) if UV C ￿ UV C, and to not recruit her and o⁄er any Wnr
C (UV C) ￿ Wr
C (UV C)
if UV C > UV C.
10Throughout the paper, superscript r (resp. nr) stands for ￿recruiting￿(resp. ￿not recruiting￿ ).
93.2 Contract O⁄ered by the Competing VC, Taking UC as Given
The same type of (backward induction) process can be used to determine the VC￿ s best response
correspondence. The characterization of the optimal contract is detailed in the appendix at the end
of the paper. If it intends to recruit the star manager, the VC maximizes the following program:
max
￿;￿
￿ + e￿ ￿ (￿ + e￿￿); (5)
subject to the star￿ s incentive compatibility (IC) constraint (6), individual rationality (IR) constraint
(7) and limited liability constraint (8):
e 2 argmax
e
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It is easy to check that in the ￿rst-best (FB) environment with a contractible e⁄ort, one would
obtain eFB = ￿
k. As is well-known, in our setting with non-veri￿able e⁄ort and limited liability for the
star, the (second-best) e⁄ort level is weakly lower than the ￿rst-best level: er
V C (UC) ￿ eFB.11 More
interestingly for our purpose below, the following result emerges from this characterization:
Lemma 1 The power of incentives ￿r
V C o⁄ered by the VC, and the star￿ s e⁄ort er
V C, are both weakly
increasing in the star￿ s reservation payo⁄ UC.





) the contract o⁄ered by the VC to hire the star would leave rents to
the star in order to elicit the desired e⁄ort level. An increase in UC would simply reduce the rent, but
11The star￿ s equilibrium e⁄ort depends on her marginal bene￿t from e⁄ort, which is her expected share of incremental
pro￿ts in the good state, ￿￿ (see IC constraint (6)). The unconstrained program would generate ￿rst-best e⁄ort by
giving the star full residual control over incremental pro￿ts, i.e. ￿ = 1, with the VC extracting all expected rents through
a ￿xed payment ￿ < 0. However, this payment would violate the star￿ s LL constraint ￿ ￿ 0. Hence any share of pro￿ts
￿￿ given to the star is forfeited for good. This implies ￿ ￿ 1, and e
r
V C (UC) ￿ e
FB.
10would have no impact on the contract f0; 1
2g o⁄ered, nor on the resulting e⁄ort er
V C = ￿
2k. However,






, IR constraint (7) is binding: The VC can no longer o⁄er f0; 1
2g, because
the star would turn down the o⁄er and take the superior rival o⁄er UC. Instead, the VC o⁄ers a
contract such that the star￿ s net expected payo⁄ is higher than UC by a small amount ". As UC
rises, the VC must increase his bid, which he does by increasing ￿r
V C, thus ￿killing two birds with one
stone.￿First, he increases the star￿ s expected compensation and ensures her participation. Second,
he increases the star￿ s marginal bene￿t from e⁄ort, ￿￿, and these higher-powered incentives lead to












would lead to an excessively high e⁄ort.
Instead, the VC o⁄ers a contract that elicits the ￿rst-best e⁄ort and ensures participation.
Using (9), one can easily derive the expected net payo⁄ for the star, Ur
V C (UC) = Wr
V C (UC) ￿
c(er
V C (UC)), and for the VC, Pr
V C (UC) = ￿+er
V C (UC)￿￿Wr
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(10)
The VC will recruit the star provided his recruitment payo⁄ Pr
V C > Pnr
V C = 0. We show that for
each value of ￿ ￿ ￿min there exists a unique threshold reservation payo⁄ UC ￿ ￿2
8k de￿ned implicitly

















such that, if UC < UC the VC recruits the star with a contract f￿r
V C (UC);￿r
V C (UC)g to the star;
and if UC ￿ UC, the VC does not recruit the star (and o⁄ers any contract f￿nr
V C;￿nr
V Cg such that
UV C (￿nr
V C;￿nr
V C) ￿ UC).
3.3 Nash Equilibria of the Subgame
In the foregoing two subsections, we characterized the corporation￿ s best-response for any UV C ￿ 0,
and the VC￿ s best response for any given UC ￿ 0. The determination of Nash equilibria (NE) follows
directly by intersecting these two correspondences.
11Proposition 1 The Nash Equilibria in this subgame are characterized as follows:










= UC, which is also the pay-
o⁄ to the star. The VC o⁄ers one of many possible contracts f￿￿
V C1;￿￿















the corporation and P￿
V C1 = 0 to the VC.
Case 2: UC > UV C: There exists a unique NE where the corporation o⁄ers W￿
C2 = UV C and the







































C2 = M￿ + S ￿ ￿, respectively.
Consider the case where UC ￿ UV C. Clearly, the star cannot receive less than UC, otherwise
at least one of the rivals would make a higher o⁄er to attract the star. By de￿nition of UC, the
VC will not outbid an o⁄er from the corporation that equals (or is higher than) UC. Hence, the






= UC, but each with a di⁄erent combination of f￿￿
V C1;￿￿
V C1g. Importantly, all of
these NE yield the same outcome, and the same payo⁄s to the di⁄erent players. In the case where
UC > UV C, the intuition is similar, with the VC o⁄ering UV C + " and hiring the star at minimum
cost.
The base return to venturing ￿ is one factor that will a⁄ect the relative threshold RPs and hence
whether the star is hired by the corporation or by the VC, and in turn the corporation net expected
payo⁄.12 When ￿ increases, the VC￿ s net expected payo⁄ after hiring the star also increases. Hence
threshold RP UC goes up as well. In contrast, the corporation, which focuses on its main line of
business, remains una⁄ected by an increase in ￿, so its threshold RP, UV C, does not vary with ￿.
Lemma 2 If the ￿rm is organized as a corporation, there exists a threshold level of return to venturing




= UV C ￿ such that the ￿rm recruits the star








. The expected net












= M ￿ UC (￿) for ￿ 2 A1
P￿





12Our results would be qualitatively the same if ￿ rather than ￿ was allowed to vary.
12When the return to venturing ￿ is small and close to ￿min, the VC has little to gain from recruiting,
and the maximum amount it can ￿bid￿for the star, UC (￿), is low. The corporation can therefore





; which grants the star the same payo⁄ as the VC￿ s
best bid. As the return to venturing increases, so does the VC￿ s bid for the star, since U
0
C (￿) > 0. The
corporation must increase its o⁄er to the star accordingly, and this negative ￿compensation cost￿e⁄ect
(of an increase in ￿) decreases its net payo⁄. As the return to venturing becomes large and crosses the
threshold b ￿, it becomes too expensive for the corporation to match the VC￿ s o⁄er. Therefore, beyond
b ￿ the corporation does not match the VC￿ s o⁄er, and the VC recruits the star.
Proposition 2 An increase in retuns to venturing ￿ increases the VC￿ s valuation for the star. This
prompts the corporation to make a higher bid for the star, thereby reducing its net expected payo⁄.
Due to this ￿compensation cost￿e⁄ect, the relative attractiveness of recruiting the star decreases with
￿, and it is negative when ￿ > b ￿:
4 Corporate Venturing
4.1 Contract O⁄ered by the Corporate Venturing Firm, Taking UV C as Given
The corporate venturing (CV) ￿rm￿ s program is nearly identical to the VC￿ s program examined in
Subsection 3.2. If it intends to recruit the star manager, the objective function is the same, up to
constant (M￿ + S):
max
e;￿;￿
￿ + e￿ ￿ (￿ + e￿￿) + M￿ + S; (13)
the IC and LL constraints are the same as in (6) and (8), respectively; and the IR constraint,
￿ + e￿￿ ￿
k
2
e2 ￿ UV Cs; (14)
di⁄ers from (7) only in that the star￿ s RP is the VC￿ s o⁄er UV Cs rather than UC, and in that the
inequality is weak.13
Hence, the equilibrium er
CV , ￿r
CV , ￿r




CV ￿ are as described in (9), but
with " = 0 and UV Cs instead of UC. As in Subsection 3.2, for any ￿ ￿ ￿min there exists a unique
13The weak inequality re￿ ects the assumption that if indi⁄erent the star will choose the ￿rm￿ s o⁄er. The subscript
V Cs refers to the VC in this second subgame rather than in the previous (￿rst) subgame.
13threshold RP to the star UV Cs such that if UV Cs ￿ UV Cs the CV ￿rm recruits the star with an o⁄er
f￿r
CV (UV Cs);￿r




























= M￿ + S ￿ ￿; (15)
where the ￿rst square-bracketed term represents the CV ￿rm￿ s expected payo⁄ from the new venture,
the second square-bracketed term represents its payo⁄ from the main business, and the right-hand
side represents its payo⁄ if it does not recruit.
4.2 Contract O⁄ered by the Competing VC, Taking UCV as Given
The program is the same as in Subsection 3.2, and hence so is the contractual o⁄er, simply replacing
UC by UCV , UC by UCV , and subscript V C by V Cs. For each value of ￿ ￿ ￿min there exists a
unique threshold UCV = UC, de￿ned in (11), such that if UCV < UCV the VC recruits the star with a
contract o⁄er f￿r
V C2 (UCV );￿r
V C2 (UCV )g; and if UCV ￿ UCV , the VC does not recruit the star, and
it o⁄ers any contract f￿nr
V Cs;￿nr
V Csg such that UV Cs (￿nr
V Cs;￿nr
V Cs) ￿ UCV .
4.3 Nash Equilibria of the Subgame
As noted above, the CV ￿rm￿ s program and the VC￿ s program generate the same equilibrium ef-
fort functions (er
CV (:) = er
V Cs (:)), and very similar managerial compensation functions (Wr
CV (:) ￿
Wr
V Cs (:)). Comparing (11) and (15), since ￿ ￿ 0; the surplus generated by the star for the CV ￿rm is
always higher than for the VC.
If the VC recruits the star, the e⁄ects of spillovers on the ￿rm￿ s main line of business will not be
internalized, and hence the spillovers will be smaller - by an amount ￿ - than if the CV ￿rm recruits
the star and internalizes the impact of spillovers. This bene￿t ￿ from recruiting does not accrue to the
VC, who has only one project and is not a⁄ected by spillovers.14 As a result, the CV ￿rm￿ s threshold
RP is higher than the VCs, and the CV ￿rm successfully recruits the star. The highest bid the VC
can o⁄er the star is UCV ; but since UV Cs ￿ UCV , the CV ￿rm matches that bid and hires the star.
Formally, the equilibria can be characterized as follows:
14Spillovers to the VC￿ s other projects or lines of business are examined in Subsection 7.2.








































o⁄ers one of many possible contracts f￿￿
V Cs;￿￿
V Csg such that U￿
V Cs (￿￿
V Cs;￿￿
V Cs) = UCV . The net
















M￿ + S and P￿
V Cs = 0, respectively.15
In this subgame, returns to venturing ￿ have no impact on recruitment. The CV ￿rm recruits the
star for all ￿ ￿ ￿min because an increase in ￿ a⁄ects the threshold RP levels for both the CV ￿rm
and the VC, UV Cs and UCV , similarly, such that UV C2 remains higher than UCV for all ￿.
Returns to venturing do a⁄ect the expected net payo⁄ from corporate venturing in several ways,
however. Note that the CV ￿rm￿ s compensation cost can be expressed as the sum of the star￿ s net












; and recall from the previous
subgame that UCV (￿) = UC (￿) is a strictly increasing function of ￿ for all ￿ ￿ ￿min.16 We can
write the CV ￿rm￿ s payo⁄ as:
P￿



















where ￿ is the base return to venturing, UCV (￿) is the net payo⁄ captured by the star, the ￿rst
square-bracketed term represents the marginal expected return from a ￿home run￿ , and the second
one represent rents from the the main line of business.
Intuitively, an increase in ￿ has:
￿ A positive ￿gravy train￿e⁄ect that takes place through ￿, and that increases the payo⁄ to ￿rms
involved in new ventures, including the CV ￿rm.
￿ A negative ￿compensation cost￿ e⁄ect that takes place through UCV (￿) = UC (￿), and that
is identical to the one faced by the corporation. An increase in ￿ increases the VC￿ s ability to
￿bid￿for star managers; and this prompts the corporation to increase its own bid for the star,
thereby reducing its net expected payo⁄.




CV g by the CV ￿rm, but each




V Csg. All of these NE yield the same outcome, and the same payo⁄ to the
di⁄erent players.
16Clearly, UCV (￿) = UC (￿) since these two thresholds make the same VC indi⁄erent between recruiting or not. As
discussed in the previous subgame, U
0
C (￿) > 0 for all ￿ ￿ ￿min.















As ￿ increases the CV ￿rm must increase the star￿ s compensation, but (as highlighted in Lemma
1) this is achieved by (weakly) increasing the power of incentives ￿￿






and in turn on the marginal expected ￿home run￿return.
Proposition 4 An increase in returns to venturing ￿ has three e⁄ects on the expected net payo⁄ from
engaging in corporate venturing: A positive ￿gravy train￿ e⁄ect, the same negative ￿compensation
cost￿ e⁄ect as in the corporation, and a positive ￿managerial incentives￿ e⁄ect. In equilibrium the
compensation cost e⁄ect exactly o⁄sets the direct and managerial incentives e⁄ects, and P￿
CV is a
constant function of ￿:
P￿
CV = M￿ + S + ", with " ! 0. (17)
This result that the compensation e⁄ect o⁄sets the two other positive e⁄ects comes from com-
petition in compensation packages between the VC and the CV ￿rm. Because of the technological
symmetry between the CV ￿rm and the VC, neither the CV ￿rm no the VC can make any pro￿t on
the new venture. This discourages the VC from recruiting the star, while still keeps the rents on the
main line of business, M￿ + S + ".
5 Organizational Choice
The last step in the characterization of the subgame-perfect equilibrium is the determination of the
￿rm￿ s organizational choice at date 0. The ￿rm will organize for corporate venturing rather than as a
corporation if and only if the relative ￿attractiveness￿of the former organizational form vis-￿-vis the
latter, ￿P￿ = P￿
CV ￿ P￿
C, is positive. In the following subsections we characterize the ￿rm￿ s optimal
organizational form, and how it is a⁄ected by returns to venturing, competition for talent, and spillover
e⁄ects.
5.1 Impact of Returns to Venturing




: The ￿rm can hire the star regardless of its organizational
form




C1, can be written:
￿P￿





















In this region, the relative attractiveness of corporate venturing is the net (of e⁄ort cost) expected
surplus from the new venture - i.e. the base return to venturing plus the expected marginal bene￿t
from hitting a ￿home run￿- minus the foregone rents on the main business [M ￿ (M￿ + S)].
Intuitively, the impact of returns to venturing on ￿P￿
1 includes the positive gravy train e⁄ect
and the positive managerial incentives e⁄ect on P￿
CV : Since P￿
C is not subject to these two e⁄ects,
they increase the relative attractiveness of corporate venturing. In contrast, the compensation costs
UCV (￿) and UC (￿) - and hence compensation costs e⁄ects of a change in ￿ - a⁄ect both payo⁄s in
the same way and hence have no impact on ￿P￿
1.
Note that there may also be a managerial incentives e⁄ect with the corporation if we assumed
a strictly positive marginal product of e⁄ort in the main line of business. The results of the model
still hold as long as the marginal product of e⁄ort is higher in the new venture than in the main line
of business. The intuition is that as the payo⁄ that must be given to the star increases (due to an
increase in ￿), the ￿rm￿ s optimal response is to increase the power of incentives. The resulting higher
e⁄ort increases the attractiveness of the organizational forms that allocate the star to higher marginal
product of e⁄ort activities, i.e., here, corporate venturing.
Lemma 3 In region A1, returns to venturing increase the relative attractiveness of corporate venturing
through the gravy train and the managerial incentives e⁄ects.




: The ￿rm only hires the star if organized for corporate ven-
turing
The relative attractiveness of corporate venturing in region A2, ￿P￿
2 = P￿
CV ￿P￿
C2, can be written:
￿P￿














￿ UCV (￿) + ￿: (19)
There are two key di⁄erences between ￿P￿
1 and ￿P￿
2. First, in region A2, the payo⁄ to the star
under corporate venturing is no longer o⁄set by an identical payo⁄ if she is hired by the corporation,
because in the latter case there is no recruitment. Hence ￿UCV (￿) appears in ￿P￿
2 and it has
17a negative impact on the relative attractiveness of corporate venturing. Second, the fact that the
corporation does not recruit in region A2 a⁄ects the rents on the main line of business through
spillovers from the new venture. With corporate venturing, the new venture is developed under the
umbrella of the ￿rm, which yields spillovers S on its main line of business. With the corporation,
it is the VC who recruits the star and develops the new venture, leading to smaller spillovers S ￿ ￿.
The rents on the main line of business are therefore larger under corporate venturing than with the
corporation, by an amount ￿, the spillover di⁄erential; and this has a positive impact on ￿P￿
2.
We know from Subsection 4.3 that the rents extracted by the star under corporate venturing exactly
o⁄set the expected bene￿t from the new venture. This has two consequences. First, the expression
for the relative attractiveness of corporate venturing simpli￿es to ￿P￿
2 = ￿ > 0: corporate venturing
is the optimal organizational form in region A2, because it allows the ￿rm to successfully recruit the
star and internalize the spillover di⁄erential. Second, returns to venturing have no impact on ￿P￿
2.
This is because the compensation cost e⁄ect associated with corporate venturing (which cancels out
in ￿P￿
1 but not in ￿P￿




Lemma 4 In region A2, ￿P￿
2 = ￿ ￿ 0. An increase in returns to venturing has no impact on the
relative attractiveness of corporate venturing, and corporate venturing is the optimal organizational
form.
Lemma 3 and 4 imply that the relative attractiveness of corporate venturing weakly increases with
returns to venturing over (￿min;1). Together with regularity conditions (1) and (2) which ensure
￿P￿ (￿min) < 0, they yield the following Proposition:




such that organizing as a corporation is









When returns to venturing are moderate (￿ 2
h
e ￿; b ￿
i
), the ￿rm chooses corporate venturing to take




), the ￿rm chooses corporate venturing for recruitment/retention purposes, in an attempt to
internalize the impact of spillovers on its main business.
185.2 Impact of Competition for Talent
Competition for talent and its interaction with returns to venturing in the organizational choice are
central features of our analysis. As a benchmark, suppose that the ￿rm does not face competition for
the star manager (e.g. there is no VC interested in her), and can recruit her as long as it pays her
at least some reservation payo⁄ U0 = 0.17 The expected net payo⁄ to the ￿rm (which successfully
recruits the star for all ￿ ￿ ￿min), depends on whether it is organized as a corporation or for corporate
venturing, and is written P￿
C0 = M ￿ U0 = M or P￿
CV 0 = ￿ + ￿2
4k + M￿ + S, respectively.18 Clearly
the relative attractiveness of corporate venturing in the absence of competition, ￿P￿
0 = ￿ + ￿2
4k ￿
[M ￿ (M￿ + S)], is increasing in ￿, and one can easily verify that there exists a threshold level









. The impact of competition for talent on corporate
venturing can then be captured as follows:
Proposition 6 Competition for talent has a positive impact on the prevalence of corporate venturing.
The threshold level of return to venturing at which the ￿rm switches to corporate venturing is lower
in presence of competition for talent than in its absence: e ￿ < e ￿0. Hence, for all ￿ 2
h
e ￿; e ￿0
￿
,
competition for talent prompts the ￿rm to engage in corporate venturing, when it would otherwise
organize as a corporation.
The intuition for this result is simple. Absent competition from the VC, both the incentives bene￿t
and the recruitment/retention bene￿t associated with corporate venturing disappear, and the ￿rm only
switches to corporate venturing at e ￿0, where the gravy train bene￿t ￿ (together with the expected
marginal bene￿t from hitting a ￿home run,￿ ￿2
4k) exactly o⁄sets the opportunity cost of not employing
the star in the main business, [M ￿ (M￿ + S)].
Competition from the VC prompts the ￿rm to react in several ways. In region A1, it increases the
star￿ s compensation whether the ￿rm is organized as a corporation or for corporate venturing, with
zero net e⁄ect on ￿P￿
1; but under corporate venturing it has the additional e⁄ect of increasing the
power of incentives. This leads to higher e⁄ort, yielding an incentives bene￿t like the one mentioned
above. In region A2, competition for talent creates a recruiting problem for the corporation, and
corporate venturing is the solution to that problem: It enables the ￿rm to successfully recruit a star
17The subscript 0 refers to the case where there is zero competition. We normalize U0 to zero for simplicity only.
18These expressions are obtained by substituting W
￿
C1 = 0 into (12), and UV Cs = U0 = 0 into P
r
CV (UV Cs), on the
left-hand side of (15), respectively.
19who would otherwise accept the VC￿ s o⁄er, and to internalize the di⁄erential impact of new venture
spillovers on its main business.
Thus whether e ￿0 is located in region A1 or A2, the marginal ￿rm, which is indi⁄erent between the
two organizational forms absent competition at e ￿0, would strictly prefer corporate venturing in a com-
petitive market for talent, in an attempt to capture either incentives bene￿ts, or recruitment/retention
bene￿ts. The implication, then is that e ￿ < e ￿0: Competition for talent strictly increases the prevalence
of corporate venturing over
h
e ￿; e ￿0
￿
.
5.3 Impact of Spillovers
Spillovers also have an impact on the ￿rm￿ s optimal organizational form. Indeed, at the switching
threshold level of returns to venturing e ￿ 2 A1 the surplus created with corporate venturing increases
with S, while the payo⁄ when organizing as a corporation is not a⁄ected.
Proposition 7 Spillovers S increase the relative attractiveness of corporate venturing and, hence,
decrease the threshold level of returns to venturing e ￿ beyond which corporate venturing is the optimal
organizational form.
As in Hellmann (2002), when products of the new venture and the main line of business are
complements, which is captured by S > 0 in our model, the new venture is developed with corporate
venturing. In contrast, when the two products are substitutes (S < 0), the new venture is developed
by a VC, or via syndication. Thus both in his model and in ours, complementarity between new
venture products and main business products favors corporate venturing.
Interestingly, in contrast to his model, here corporate venturing may still be optimal even if S is
negative. Important for this result is the fact that even when the new venture has a very negative
impact on the main business, corporate venturing may still be optimal if it prevents the VC from
recruiting the star and starting the venture, in which case the impact on the main business would
be even worse, by an amount ￿. (Another di⁄erence with his model is that here spillovers are not
restricted to product-market complementarity or substitutability, and may take a more general form.
See discussion in section 8.)
206 Control Rights Allocation and the Di⁄erent Types of Corporate
Venturing
Corporate venturing is a general expression that is typically used to describe all types of investments
made by corporations into new ventures that are distinct from their core business. In practice, however,
corporate venturing investments can take many forms. At one end of the spectrum is the ￿internal
venture￿ : The parent company invests in a new ventures that is legally part of the organization,
even if somewhat independent from the main line of business. At the other end of the spectrum is
￿corporate venture capital￿ : The parent company invests in an external start-up company, through a
￿captive￿fund (Hellmann, 2002), of which the corporate parent acts as a general partner. The key
di⁄erence between the various types of corporate venturing is the allocation of control rights over the
idea/venture: In internal ventures, the allocation of control, and hence bargaining power, is clearly
tilted in favor of the parent company, but the relative allocation of control becomes more favorable to
the star in setups closer to corporate venture capital.
In our model where payo⁄s are contractible, all agency problems are addressed using payo⁄-
contingent contracts, and there is no scope for discussion of property/control rights allocation. Re-
gardless of who owns the intellectual property - be it the ￿rm or the star- the two parties are bound by
the veri￿able contract signed at date 1, and there is no scope for renegotiation, ex post bargaining and
the like. Contracts are complete. As we have shown throughout the paper, this complete contracting
approach yields interesting and tractable results. In this extension we depart from this framework
and introduce contractual incompleteness by assuming that part of the realized payo⁄ from the new
venture is not contractible at date 1. Introducing contractual incompleteness is interesting for two
reasons. The ￿rst one is realism: New ventures are typically very uncertain, with the nature of the
innovation di¢ cult to describe, and contracts are likely to be incomplete. The second reason is that it
generates scope for discussion of the optimal allocation of property/control rights and of the di⁄erent
types of corporate venturing.
To make this framework comparable to our base complete contracting model, we assume that the
￿home run￿marginal payo⁄ ￿ is not contractible, while the base payo⁄ ￿ is. The initial contract at
date 1 therefore speci￿es only a payo⁄ ￿ ￿ ￿ to be paid to star at date 4, and the remaining payo⁄
￿ ￿ ￿ to the ￿rm. The contract may also specify the relative allocation of control/property rights
over the idea, ￿. The variable ￿ may for example represent the fraction of the realized payo⁄ that
21the star can obtain (or the probability that she would successfully replicating the venture elsewhere)
if bargaining breaks down, while the ￿rm gets (1 ￿ ￿). The marginal payo⁄ ￿ is bargained over at
date 4 if it is realized. Assuming Nash-like bargaining, the fraction f of ￿ extracted by the star will
depend on both negotiating parties￿relative threat points at that time, which in turn depend on ￿.
In the example just given, Nash bargaining implies f (￿) = ￿.19 Then the problem with incomplete
contracting becomes exactly the same as the one in the base case, simply replacing ￿ by ￿ and ￿ by
￿.
Lemma 5 All the key results of the model still hold in an incomplete contracts framework. The main
di⁄erence comes from the interpretation of the source of incentives for the star. In the complete
contracting scenario, it was the result of explicit pro￿t sharing contracted at date 1. In this incomplete
contracting scenario, it comes from control rights assigned at date 1, and the associated bargaining
power at date 4.
An interesting consequence of this exercise is that, since in the complete contracting base model ￿
(weakly) increases with returns to venturing under corporate venturing (see lemma ??), the implication
in the context of incomplete contracting and the various types of corporate venturing is the following:
Proposition 8 In the presence of competition for talent, when corporate venturing is optimal, the
￿rm allocates control rights di⁄erently depending on returns to venturing: as returns to venturing
increase, more control rights are allocated to the star, gradually switching from types of venturing that
are closer to internal ventures, to ones that resemble more corporate venture capital.
The foregoing results shed light on how the interaction between returns to venturing and com-
petition for talent a⁄ects the endogenous allocation of control rights between the CV ￿rm and the
star, and the di⁄erent types of corporate venturing. In contrast, other authors, including Anand
et al. (2004), and Hellmann (2006), have examined the way changes in the exogenous allocation of
intellectual property (IP) rights a⁄ect corporate venturing. Interestingly, our model could also be
extended to address this issue. Suppose that neither ￿ nor ￿ are contractible at date 0,20 and that
the star and the ￿rm or VC bargain over realized payo⁄ at date 4. Consider two IP regimes. In
the entrepreneur-friendly regime, the star owns the idea and can costlessly replicate the new venture
somewhere else if bargaining breaks down. Assuming Nash Bargaining for example, the star extracts
19For a thorough discussion on analogies beween complete and incomplete contracts settings, see Tirole (1999).
20The same results obtain if, as before, ￿ is contractible.
22all rents in renegotiation at date 4. In the ￿rm/VC-friendly regime, the ￿rm or the VC (depending
on whom the star chose) owns the idea, and extracts all rents at date 4.21
In the ￿rm/VC-friendly regime, the intuition is very similar to that of our main model, but with
zero e⁄ort from the the star, since she anticipates that all rents will be extracted by her employer.
In that case, the gravy train and recruitment/retention e⁄ects are still present and there still exists a
threshold level of returns to venturing such that corporate venturing is optimal beyond that threshold.
In the entrepreneur-friendly regime, if the venture were ￿nanced, the star would have ￿rst-best
incentives, since she anticipates extracting all rents. However, for the same reason the VC expects a
zero return and does not compete for the star. The ￿rm, will obtain a payo⁄ M￿ +S if organized for
corporate venturing, and M if organized as a corporation. By regularity condition 1, M > M￿ + S,
and hence the ￿rm organizes as a corporation in equilibrium. The key implication, then, is that while
in entrepreneur-friendly regimes yield higher entrepreneurial e⁄ort and higher success probability in
ventures that are ￿nanced, they generate less corporate venturing and new venture creation than
￿rm/VC-friendly regimes. This result is consistent with Anand et al. (2004), and contrasts with
Hellmann (2006) where corporate venturing (intrapreneurship) is more prevalent in entrepreneur-
friendly IP regimes.
7 Other Applications and Extensions
7.1 Competition, E¢ ciency, and Economic Activity
Corporate venturing is socially optimal if and only if the total surplus generated in the ￿rst-best (net
of e⁄ort cost), ￿ + ￿2
2k + M￿ + S, is higher than both i) the total surplus that could be created by
allocating the star manager to the competitor, i.e. ￿+ ￿2
2k from the venture plus M￿ +S ￿￿ from the





+ M￿ + S ￿ ￿ +
￿2
2k





+ M￿ + S ￿ M: (21)
21Alternatively, we could interpret the entrepreneur-friendly regime as one in which the entrepreneur bene￿ts from
strong IP protection, and the ￿rm/VC-friendly regime as one in which IP protection for the entrepreneur is weak. This
intepretation is more closely related to Anton and Yao (1995), and Anand et al. (2004).
23Condition (20) reduces very simply to ￿￿ ￿ 0, which always holds in our model; and inequality
(21) holds if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿FB with ￿FB = [M ￿ (M￿ + S)] ￿ ￿2
2k. Thus, corporate venturing is
socially optimal for all ￿ ￿ ￿FB. The following result then obtains:
Proposition 9 In equilibrium there is less corporate venturing than is socially optimal: e ￿ > ￿FB.
Competition for talent simultaneously increases the prevalence of corporate venturing and improves
economic e¢ ciency.
This ine¢ ciency is due to agency costs in corporate venturing. When e⁄ort is not directly con-
tractible, the ￿rm has to leave rents to the star to induce her to exert a high e⁄ort level, and this
usually leads to a second-best e⁄ort level from the star. This agency cost constrains the rents captured
by the ￿rm if it engages in corporate venturing, and induces ￿rms to switch to corporate venturing




, the ￿rm chooses to remain organized
as a corporation even though from a social point of view it ought to organize for corporate venturing.
This ine¢ ciency is even larger absent competition for talent, since as shown in Proposition 6, in that
case the ￿rm switches to corporate venturing ￿even later,￿at e ￿0 > e ￿. As discussed in subsection 5.2,
competition for talent increases equilibrium compensation for the star, and under corporate venturing
leads to higher-powered incentives and higher e⁄ort exertion. This simultaneously improves the relative
attractiveness of corporate venturing and its prevalence in the
h
e ￿0; e ￿
￿
region, and economic e¢ ciency.
7.2 Spillovers
So far we have assumed that spillovers a⁄ect only the ￿rm￿ s main line of business, and that the VC
receives no spillovers on other ventures in its portfolio. This assumption was made both for simplicity,
and to yield starker results. In this Subsection we generalize the model to allow the VC￿ s other projects
to bene￿t from spillovers from the new venture.22 The following results can readily be shown:
Proposition 10 In the more general model where the VC also enjoys a spillover SV C if it recruits
the star, and SV C ￿ ￿V C if she is not, all results remains unchanged as long as ￿V C ￿ ￿, i.e. as long
as the spillover di⁄erential is higher for the ￿rm than for the VC. If ￿V C > ￿, then for all ￿ 2 A1 the
￿rm chooses to organize as a corporation rather than for corporate venturing, and for all ￿ 2 A2, the
￿rm is indi⁄erent between the two organizational forms.
22This is consistent with Lindsey (2002), who ￿nds evidence of a keiretsu e⁄ect in venture capital, suggesting that VCs
do bene￿t from spillovers by facilitating collaborations between their portfolio ventures.
24As long as ￿V C ￿ ￿, if organized for corporate venturing the ￿rm has a higher incentive to recruit
the star than the VC; and therefore, as before, it recruits the star under this organizational form. On
the other hand, if ￿V C > ￿, the VC bene￿ts more from recruiting the star, and it recruits the star
whenever the ￿rm is organized for corporate venturing. Hence, organizing as a corporation is optimal
when it yields a higher payo⁄ than not recruiting, i.e. in region A1. In region A2, the ￿rm cannot
recruit the star regardless of its organizational form, and is therefore indi⁄erent between the two.23
8 Empirical Implications
Our model yields a number of empirical predictions that can improve our understanding of corporate
venturing in general, and of its structure in particular. Beyond corporate venturing, it also points to
a potential link between labor market competition and ￿rm productivity. In what follows we discuss
these predictions and their relation to the empirical literature.
Determinants of Corporate Venturing Investments
A key contribution of our model is to shed light on the reasons why ￿rms engage in corporate
venturing activities, and we identify three key explanations. The gravy train rationale simply states
that ￿rms engage in corporate venturing in an attempt to capture some the high returns returns they
observe in new ventures, and therefore suggests that higher venturing returns should increase CV
investments.
The incentives rationale captures the idea that as the star￿ s reservation payo⁄ (the compensation
she expects to obtain in the labor market) increases, ￿rms respond by o⁄ering higher-powered incen-
tives;24 this induces stars to exert more e⁄ort, and increases the relative attractiveness of venturing
activities where the star￿ s marginal product of e⁄ort is higher. This increase in the star￿ s market
compensation may come from higher returns to venturing, which prompt employers to ￿bid￿higher
to recruit star managers. Alternatively, it may come from a rise in the degree of competition for
23Another possible extension is to take into account the state-contingent nature of spillovers. For instance, product
market competition or complementarities may vary with the success of the venture. Alternatively, a successful venture
may provide a technological breakthrough that will help the main business, while a failed venture may be a relatively
cheap way of testing an uncertain technology. Or the relationship between the star and the ￿rm may provide the former
with a rehiring rent in case of failure. The most interesting aspect of state-contingent spillovers is that they may enhance
incentives if they are ￿procyclical,￿or instead lead to the traditional tradeo⁄ between incentives or insurance if they are
￿counter-cyclical.￿They would likely a⁄ect the balance between the ￿rm and the VC through their relative magnitude
and through this incentives e⁄ect only.
24This is consistent with ￿ndings by Core and Guay (2001) and Oyer and Schaefer (2005), who document the positive
relation between ￿rms￿use of stock options plans (i.e. high-powered incentives) and the degree of competition in the
labor market.
25talent, for a given level of venturing returns. For example, the shortage of talent may vary across in-
dustries/sectors and across time, generating variation in the intensity of competition to recruit stars.
Thus the incentives rationale suggests that both higher venturing returns and stronger competition
for talent should increase CV investments.
Finally, the recruitment/retention suggests that ￿rms may engage in corporate venturing in an at-
tempt to successfully recruit stars who would otherwise take employment elsewere.25 This explanation
is echoed by the Corporate Venturing Journal, which stated that: ￿One of the reasons for corporate
venturing is to attract and retain employees who have the right skills and mindset to operate e⁄ec-
tively in the new economy [...].￿(September 2000, Issue 3). Firms￿concern about failing to recruit or
retain star managers is stronger when these stars have access to higher levels of market compensation,
which again could result from high levels of venturing returns or from strong competition for talent.
Corporate venturing investments should therefore increase in both of these situations.
Thus, our three rationales point to two primary factors that will likely a⁄ect corporate venturing
investments:
Prediction 1: Higher returns to venturing should increase corporate venturing investments.
Prediction 2: Stronger competition for talent should increase corporate venturing investment.
Prediction 1 is consistent with the pro-cyclicality of CV with entrepreneurial activity to which we
referred in the introduction to motivate the model, and with the literature, which identi￿es ￿nancial
returns as primary determinants of corporate venturing (Siegel, Siegel and MacMillan, 1988; Winter
and Mur￿n, 1988, Chesbrough, 2002). This prediction is also broadly consistent with with Dushnitsky
and Lenox (2005b), who ￿nd that greater technological opportunities - which are presumably associated
with higher expected returns to venturing - have a positive impact on corporate venturing. They report
that a large fraction (79%) of corporate venture capital funds is invested in sectors in the top quartile
in terms of technological opportunities.
Prediction 2 is more novel, and may stimulate future empirical research. To that end, one could
proxy competition for talent - which in our model arises from the presence of a VC competing with
25Losing employees was a real problem for ￿rms at the peak of the entrepreneurial boom in the late 1990s, as noted in
Computer World:
￿Thirty-two percent of traditional U.S. ￿rms have lost employees to dot-coms, according to a survey of
3,400 executives conducted by BrilliantPeople.com, the online recruiting site of Managements Recruiters
International Inc. in Cleveland. In New England, 51.7% of ￿rms reported employee losses to internet ￿rms.
On the West Coast, 44.8% of ￿rms reported losing employees to startups, followed by the Middle Atlantic
region, with 42.7%. The Midwest and South Central regions had the lowest employee losses, with 78.2% and
86.8% respectively, saying they haven￿ t lost employees.￿(September 4, 2000, p.56, business news section).￿
26the ￿rm for the recruitment of a star manager - with measures of labor mobility for example. Indeed,
Fallick, Fleischmann and Rebitzer (2006) ￿nd higher job mobility in the Silicon Valley￿ s computer
industry than in computer clusters elsewhere, and a natural application of our model would be to
relate variation in job mobility to variation in corporate venturing investments. Another possible
proxy for labor market competition would be the geographic proximity of ￿rms to centres of venture
capital activity: ￿rms closely located to the Silicon Valley, for instance, would likely face stronger
competition for talent from local venture capitalists and startups. Finally, temporal and industry
variations in the university wage premium (i.e. the di⁄erence in wage between university graduates
and high-school graduates) may also adequately capture variations in the degree of competition for
talent. Using these measure of competition for talent to examine its impact on corporate venturing
investment would - it seems - be fruitful.
Our analysis also suggests that corporate venturing investments may be a⁄ected by two other
factors. One such factor is spillovers, broadly de￿ned as any (positive or negative) impact of the new
venture on the main business.
Prediction 3: Greater spillovers from the new venture to the main business should increase corporate
venturing investments.
Spillovers are sometimes grouped under the more generic name of ￿strategic factors￿in the cor-
porate venturing literature. Block and MacMillan (1993), and Chesbrough (2002) report that these
strategic factors play an important role in the decision to pursue corporate venturing activities. In
the US for example, 76% of corporate venturing ￿rms pursue these activities for strategic purposes
(Block and MacMillan, 1993).
Spillovers could be interpreted in several ways. For example, they could be technology spillovers, al-
lowing the ￿rm to gain access to a new technology for the main business; knowledge spillovers, enabling
the ￿rm to improve its expertise; or product-market spillovers such as complementarity/substitutability
between the new venture product and main business product.26 All three types of spillovers have been
26Spillovers may also come from the labor market, or the ￿nancial market. On the labor side, establishing a record
of corporate venturing may help the ￿rm to motivate its existing employees, and attact new talent, in the main line
of business. Moreover, the ￿rm and the manager of the new venture will learn about one another through corporate
venturing, and the ￿rm may have a strategic advantage in reallocating the star to a task that ￿ts both her expertise and
her tastes, after ￿harvesting￿the new venture. In other words, the ￿rm may bene￿t from a rehiring rent. On the ￿nancing
side, projects developed through corporate venturing can help in the ￿nancing of future projects associated with the main
line of business. They may also be negatively correlated to the main line of business and trigger spillovers in terms of tax
deductions or a decrease in expected bankruptcy costs. Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri (2004) document ￿nancial spillovers
in Banking, showing that banks target their venture capital investments to ￿rms that may subsequently use their lending
services.
27identi￿ed in the empirical literature as having an impact on CV. Siegel et al. (1988) identify ￿exposure
to new technologies and markets￿as a key objective for CV ￿rms, while Winters and Mur￿n (1988)
underline how corporate venturing may enable ￿rms to gain a ￿window on new technology/business.￿
Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005b) document the impact of knowledge spillovers, reporting that ￿the more
closely aligned the domains of expertise of the ￿rm and a particular sector, the greater the likelihood
that the ￿rm will invest in [corporate venturing] in that sector.￿Finally, Dushnitsky and Shaver (2006)
￿nd that the greater the complementarity between the products of the corporate parent and those of
the entrepreneur, the greater the likelihood of a corporate venturing relationship to form.
Our model also predicts that the strength of intellectual property (IP) protection for the inventor
should have an impact on CV. Corporate venturing should be more prevalent when IP protection is
weaker, because in such cases investors (in the form of ￿rms or VCs) anticipate reaping rewards from
the new venture, and are more willing to ￿nance ventures in the ￿rst place.
Prediction 4: Weaker IP protection for the inventor should increase corporate venturing invest-
ments.
This prediction is consistent with recent empirical work on corporate venturing and its connection
to IP protection. Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005b), for instance, derive a measure of the e⁄ectiveness of
patents in protecting inventors￿pro￿ts, and ￿nd that the weaker the IP protection for the inventor (i.e.
the lower the e⁄ectiveness of these patents), the higher the prevalence of corporate venturing. They
also show that weaker IP protection may improve the innovation rate in ￿rms engaged in corporate
venturing (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005a).
Structure of Corporate Venturing
The literature on corporate venturing suggests that it may be structured in many ways, di⁄ering
mainly in the degree of autonomy of the new venture from the corporate parent (Rind, 1981; Roberts
and Berry, 1985; Bleicher and Paul, 1987; Gompers, 2002). Our model captures this idea explicitly:
The structure of corporate venturing is de￿ned in terms of relative control rights allocation and hence
in terms of the star autonomy from the corporate parent. Moreover, prior work suggests that the
key advantage of autonomy in the structure of CV is improved innovative activity (Fast, 1981, Sykes,
1986; Russell, 1995; Thornhill and Amit, 2000). This is also consistent with our model where more
autonomy in the form of control rights increases the star￿ s ex post bargaining power and hence her ex
ante incentives to exert e⁄ort. On the other hand, a tighter relationship between the new venture and
the corporate parent may enable the new venture to take advantage of the parent￿ s core competencies
28(Dougherty, 1995).
Dushnitsky and Shaver (2006) argue that the degree of autonomy of the new venture might facilitate
the formation of corporate venturing activities, by alleviating the star/entrepreneur￿ s concerns about
imitation/expropriation by the corporate parent; and ￿nd empirical support for this hypothesis. But
what exogenous factors might a⁄ect the optimal choice of corporate venturing structure? Our model
suggests that returns to venturing may play a role in that regard. It predicts that as returns to
venturing increase, more autonomy (i.e. control rights) should be allocated to the star, and the
organization of corporate venturing should gradually switch from a structure closer to internal ventures,
to one that resemble more corporate venture capital:
Prediction 5: Higher returns to venturing should a⁄ect the organization of corporate venturing
activities, leading to structures where the new venture gradually becomes more independent from the
corporate parent.
Beyond Corporate Venturing: Competition for Talent and Productivity
Finally, the model allows us to make a more general prediction about the connection between labor
market competition and ￿rm productivity:
Prediction 6: Competition for talent should increase ￿rm productivity.
Competition for talent, through its positive impact on equilibrium compensation and the power of
incentives, may lead to increased managerial e⁄ort towards the ￿rst-best, thus generating productivity
gains. Investigating this link empirically would be the logical next step, and in our opinion a promising
avenue for future research.27
9 Conclusion
A natural explanation for corporate venturing and its pro-cyclicality with returns to entrepreneurship
is that ￿rms engage in corporate venturing in an attempt to capture a share of these returns when they
are high. This ￿gravy train￿e⁄ect may explain the positive impact of venturing returns on corporate
venturing. This seems unlikely to be the only explanation, however. The lower returns associated with
CV investments, relative to independent VC investments returns (Fast, 1981; Zahra, 1996; Gompers
and Lerner, 1998, Gompers, 2002), suggest that investments through traditional venture funds would
likely be a better way to scoop the ￿gravy.￿
27Finding evidence con￿rming this prediction would also corroborate prediction 2, as in our model the increase in
productivity is associated with increased corporate venturing.
29In this paper we propose two novel explanations for corporate venturing and its pro-cyclical ￿ uctu-
ations with entrepreneurial activity. We argue that ￿rms may engage in corporate venturing activities
also to bene￿t from the superior managerial incentives in new ventures, and to recruit or retain key
talent. A important insight to emerge from our analysis is that competition for talent is a key factor
in determining corporate venturing investments. This and the other testable predictions of the model
suggest several fruitful avenues for future empirical research.
A Appendix: Characterization of the VC￿ s Optimal Contract








Replacing ￿ in the objective function (5), we can re-write the VC￿ s program as follows:
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We de￿ne UC as the threshold RP to the star (from the corporation) such that the VC is indi⁄erent
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there must exist a unique UC ￿ ￿2
8k de￿ned as in (11), such that it is optimal for the VC to recruit if
and only if UC < UC.28
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11 Proof of Lemma 1
It follows directly from the characterization of the optimal contract, and from expression (9) in the
text, that the power of incentives ￿r
V C (UC) and equilibrium e⁄ort er
V C (UC) are both weakly increasing
functions of UC. ￿
2 Proof of Proposition 1
Follows directly from the text. ￿
3 Proof of Lemma 2
From (11), the derivative U
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8k, we obtain U
0
C (￿) > 0 for all
￿ ￿ ￿min.
In contrast, UV C = M ￿ (M￿ + S ￿ ￿) is independent of ￿. From regularity constraint (1)
UV C > ￿2
8k + " + ￿ > ￿2
8k = UC (￿min).1 Since U
0
C (￿) > 0, UC is continuous at all ￿ ￿ ￿min, and
U
0
V C (￿) = 0, there must exist a threshold level of return to venturing b ￿ > ￿min - de￿ned implicitly as




= UV C - such that UC (￿) ￿ UV C if and only if ￿ ￿ b ￿. Then the corporation




. The expression for the expected
net payo⁄ P￿
C (￿) can be deduced directly from Proposition 1. ￿
4 Proof of Proposition 2
The payo⁄ to the corporation is clearly expressed in (12), and the impact of returns to venturing on
this payo⁄ can be written:
1If regularity conditions (1) and (2) do not hold, then for some parameter values, a special case may occur where
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5 Proof of Proposition 3
Follows directly from the text. ￿
6 Proof of Proposition 4
























The direct e⁄ect is represented by the number one on the right-hand side (RHS) of (A3). The
￿compensation cost￿e⁄ect is captured by the second term on the RHS of (A3). A proof identical to
that of Lemma 2 shows that this e⁄ect is negative. Finally, the third term on the RHS of (A3) re￿ ects
the positive ￿managerial incentives￿e⁄ect. Using the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2, this e⁄ect is easily
shown to be positive.
To see that P￿

















This can be rewritten as:















Since the CV ￿rm and the VC make the same o⁄er and elicit the same e⁄ort, i.e. er
V Cs (:) =
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, we can substitute (A5) into (16) and obtain P￿
CV = [M￿ + S] + ", with " ! 0.










d￿ ￿ = 0. ￿
37 Proof of Lemma 3
The ￿rm recruits the star under both organizational forms. The star￿ s payo⁄ is the same under both
organizational structures (UCV (￿) = UC (￿)), and therefore cancels out of ￿P￿
1. Equation (18) then
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8 Proof of Lemma 4
Follows directly from the text. ￿
9 Proof of Proposition 5
It is su¢ cient to prove the existence of e ￿. Like P￿
CV (￿) and P￿
C (￿), ￿P￿ (￿) is a continuous function
of ￿ over A1 [ A2. Moreover, (1) and (2) imply that ￿P￿ (￿min) < 0, and from Lemmas 3 and 4,













such that ￿P￿ (￿) ￿ 0 (in which case corporate venturing is





10 Proof of Proposition 6
From the text we know that P￿
CV 0 = ￿ + ￿2
4k + (M￿ + S) and P￿
C0 = M. Therefore the relative
attractiveness of corporate venturing in the absence of competition can be written:
￿P￿
0 = P￿
CV 0 ￿ P￿
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0 (￿min) = " ￿ [M ￿ (M￿ + S)] < 0 (from
regularity condition (1)), and c)
d(￿P￿
0)
d￿ = 1 over [￿min;1), there must exist a threshold level e ￿0 >
￿min such that ￿P￿





2If regularity conditions (1) and (2) do not hold, then for some parameter values, a special case may occur where
￿P
￿ (￿) ￿ 0 for all values of ￿ 2 [￿min;1). In that less interesting case, corporate venturing is always optimal.





















From the proof of Lemma 2 we know that UCV (￿min) = UC (￿min) = ￿2
8k. Using (9), we obtain
￿P￿
1 (￿min) ￿ ￿P￿
0 (￿min) = ￿2
8k > 0.
From the proof of Lemma 2, U
0
CV (￿) > 0 for all ￿ ￿ ￿min. Hence UCV (￿) > ￿2
8k, for all























is weakly increasing in UCV for all UCV (￿) > ￿2
8k, and weakly increasing in ￿ for















= 0. This implies that
￿P￿
0 switches from negative to positive at a threshold level e ￿0 > e ￿. ￿
11 Proof of Proposition 7














































































strictly increases with e ￿, and hence
@￿P￿
1
@e ￿ > 0. Since
@￿P￿
1
@S > 0, this implies that de ￿
dS < 0. ￿
12 Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose that ￿ is not contractible, while ￿ is. The initial contract at date 1 therefore speci￿es only
a payo⁄ ￿ ￿ ￿ to be paid to star at date 4, and the remaining payo⁄ ￿￿￿ to the ￿rm. The contract
may also specify the relative allocation of control/property rights over the idea, ￿. The variable ￿
5represents the fraction of the realized payo⁄that the star can obtain (or the probability that she would
successfully replicating the venture elsewhere) if bargaining breaks down, while the ￿rm gets (1 ￿ ￿).
The marginal payo⁄ ￿ is bargained over at date 4 if it is realized. Assuming Nash bargaining, the
star will give a transfer t to the ￿rm, such that t 2 argmax(￿ ￿ t ￿ ￿￿)(t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿). This yields
t = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ leaving the star with ￿ ￿ t = ￿￿, and the ￿rm with t = (1 ￿ ￿)￿.
Thus, the ￿rm chooses ￿ and ￿ to maximize ￿ + e￿ ￿ (￿ + e￿￿), in exactly the same way as
it chose ￿ and ￿, respectively, in our base model. Then the problem with incomplete contracting
becomes exactly the same as the one in the base case, simply replacing ￿ by ￿ and ￿ by ￿. ￿
13 Proof of Proposition 8
Follows directly from the text. ￿
14 Proof of Proposition 9
We have shown in the text that corporate venturing is optimal from a social point of view if ￿ ￿ ￿FB;
with








In contrast, the ￿rm￿ s switching threshold level e ￿ satis￿es (A9). We need only show that e ￿ > ￿FB.




, the ￿rm choose to remain organized as a corporation even though from a social
point of view it ought to organize for corporate venturing.
If ￿FB < ￿min = ￿￿2
4k + ", then e ￿ > ￿min > ￿FB, and the prevalence of corporate venturing is




socially desirable corporate venturing does not take place.






























Since, for all ￿ ￿ ￿min, UCV (￿) ￿ ￿2

























6for all UCV ￿ ￿2




￿ 0 for all ￿FB ￿ ￿min.
The proof that competition for talent simultaneously increases the prevalence of corporate ventur-
ing and improves economic e¢ ciency follows directly from the text. ￿
15 Proof of Proposition 10
Assume that the VC enjoys spillovers from the new venture to its other portfolio ventures. These
spillovers take on value SV C if the new venture is developed by the VC, and SV C ￿ ￿V C if it is
developed by the ￿rm. Then:
1. If the ￿rm is organized as a corporation, the threshold RP UC faced by the VC is now slightly
higher, re￿ ecting the impact of the VC￿ s spillover di⁄erential ￿V C on its surplus from recruitment.











= ￿￿V C: (A14)
In turn the higher value of UC implies a lower value of b ￿, the threshold level of returns to
venturing beyond which the VC, rather than the corporation, recruits the star.
2a If the ￿rm is organized for corporate venturing, its threshold RP UV C remains unchanged,
implicitly de￿ned as in (15). It follows directly that, if ￿ ￿ ￿V C, the ￿rm can always recruit the
star if organized for corporate venturing. Our qualitative results are as above, even though the
key thresholds e ￿ and b ￿ might be di⁄erent.
2b If on the other hand, ￿ < ￿V C, then the VC, rather than the ￿rm, recruits the star when the ￿rm
is organized for corporate venturing. The ￿rm receives M￿+S￿￿ if i) it organizes for corporate
venturing, or ii)) it organizes as a corporation and ￿ > b ￿. Therefore, the ￿rm organizes as a









(in which case we have assumed it chooses corporate venturing). ￿
7